Donald Trump: Foreign Policy Heretic, Foreign Policy Visionary

In addition to rocking the political firmament in Washington with his full throated championing of American workers, Donald Trump is also breaking with many long standing Republican orthodoxies on foreign policy.

Donald Trump's foreign policy can be summed up in two words: America First. He says this openly and proudly--the New York Times quotes him as saying "Not an isolationist but I am America First....I like the expression."

I like the expression, too. I like the notion of an American President who will champion American interests, and not global interests.

Why should we keep troops on the border between North and South Korea? North Korea is a pariah nation, and even its sole sponsor China is not going to blithely go along with any military adventurism south of the 38th parallel. The 38th parallel is no longer a front line in the battle against Soviet expansionism; the historic rationale for a continued military presence does not apply--either devise a new rationale or bring the troops home.

Likewise Trump is correct to question NATO. The NATO alliance was both a reaction to the Second World War and to the rise of Soviet expansionism in the immediate aftermath; NATO's own official history states that "the Alliance’s creation was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration". 

The Soviet Union is no more, and Putin's Russia is a problematic threat, given its shrinking population and shrinking economy. Europe is already politically and economically integrated--some would say too much so. Neither France nor Germany--the leading political and economic actors in Europe--show any appetite for military adventurism on the continent or abroad. Against what threats do US troops stationed in Europe guard? And exactly whom are they guarding--Europe or the United States?

Moreover, as Brussels tragically demonstrates, the NATO alliance does nothing to stop ISIS from exporting terror into the western world. NATO has not stopped jihadist attacks in New York on 9/11, in Madrid and London in 2005, nor in Paris earlier this year. As an alliance predicated on mutual defense and protection, NATO is failing its members horribly against the enemy of radical Islam. Trump is right: NATO is obsolete.

US military adventurism in Iraq under Bush and Libya under Obama has not turned out at all well--sobering realities that speak to the limits of what military power can achieve: US military might is formidable, but no military can build nations ex nihilo, and no military can impose democracy on a people from without. US military muscle can topple dictators--and Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were unquestionably dictators--but it cannot create stable governments to take their place. For all the seeming electoral successes in Iraq in the years following the US invasion in 2003, without US troops the artificially created regime in Baghdad quickly lost credibility and legitimacy, and is now too weak to confront ISIS militarily even on Iraqi soil.

Challenging these assumptions does not make Trump an isolationist. It does make him a realist. And it calls to mind George Washington's warning in his farewell address two centuries ago against entangling foreign alliances; they were dangerous then and they are dangerous now. Not every foreign crisis calls for the sacrifice of American blood and treasure. Not every foreign crisis is a significant threat to America or American interests.

Contrary to the "experts" of the establishment, "America First" is a vision of foreign policy. It means to measure each foreign engagement, each foreign alliance, each deployment of troops in foreign lands, against the cold objective yardstick of how these things benefit the United States. Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute is wrong to say "'greatness' is not a foreign policy"; in fact, it is the only foreign policy stance worth having--it is the stance that says "engage where it benefits America and disengage where it does not."

The duty of the American government is to advance the interests of the American people. Donald Trump is the only candidate willing to say that, and willing to do that--loudly and proudly.

Remembering 9/11

Ten years ago today, four passenger jets were hijacked by Al Qaeda terrorists. Two were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, one was flown into the Pentagon, and the fourth crashed in a field in Pennsylvania when its passengers, realizing what was going on, fought the highjackers for control of the plane.

Ten years ago today, over three thousand men and women died in the deadliest terrorist attack on US soil (and arguably the deadliest terrorist attack anywhere).

Today, news commentators, pundits, and bloggers such as myself comment on this tragedy. Some seek meaning; others seek to prove some larger point. I will do neither.

What I know of 9/11 is this: I know that at least one person whom I knew personally, albeit not closely, was in the World Trade Center that day and died. I know that my neighbor's grandson some years later served in Afghanistan--and because he is serving was not able to make her memorial service when my neighbor passed away last year. I know that, living close to a major airport, the lack of airplane noises because all aircraft are grounded is a silence that is far past eerie. I know that, after 9/11, several aspects of my work and my business as an IT consultant were changed--how to sustain computer networks after terrorist attacks became a disturbing and pressing reality.

What I do not know of 9/11 is whether the act itself "proved" anything. If it "proved" some weakness of the United States, why have there been no similarly successful attacks since then? If it "proved" the strength of Al Qaeda, why did Osama bin Laden spend the rest of his life in hiding?

Nor do I know if 9/11 means anything at all. Three thousand people died because some twenty or so terrorists chose to kill them, in a burst of hatred and violence that is quite beyond my understanding. I do not know why Al Qaeda and its supporters feel such hatred for the US. I do not know why terrorists feel that an orgy of violence is necessary to advance their cause. I do not know, and I do not understand. In all honesty, I do not want to understand--who would want to fathom the minds of murderers?

But I remember something else of that day. I remember that the sun rose, and the sun set. I remember that I got up, exercised, showered, and went off to work. I remember that I came home to a hot meal and a soft bed. I remember that, while three thousand did die tragic deaths, life itself continued.

Today the sun rises just as it did ten years ago. It will set just at it did ten years ago. Come the evening, I will again enjoy a hot meal and a soft bed, and I will again think upon those people who will never again enjoy either. Life itself will continue.

This is how I choose to remember 9/11. That, despite death and destruction, in spite of terror and tragedy, life itself continues--as it always has, and as it always will. Whatever successes Al Qaeda may have had that day, defeating life in all its inevitability is not among them.

Libya: Mission (Not Yet) Accomplished?

This week's award for the most ironic journalistic paragraph goes to Ben Smith of Politico, who opened his 22 August 2011 piece on the Libyan civil war thusly:

The fall of Tripoli is a foreign policy triumph for which President Barack Obama won’t hold a ticker-tape parade: no flight suit, no chest-thumping, no “Mission Accomplished” banner.

While the sentiment would have been ironic regardless of events within Libya (not to mention a tad hypocritical, declaring a "foreign policy triumph" for Barack Obama while delivering yet another implied rebuke of President Bush's theatrics when declaring the end of "major military operations" in Iraq), the irony was compounded by the fact that Tripoli had indeed fallen--but fallen into chaos, confusion, and a very messy urban brawl, as Gadhafi loyalists mounted a counter-attack and retook several portions of the city.

The rebel hand was further weakened when Seif al-Islam el-Gadhafi, the Gadhafi son reported captured by the rebels, hours later made a television appearance to taunt the rebels.

Far from being a "foreign policy triumph", Obama's strategy of "leading from behind" has produced yet another grim reminder that, even in the 21st century, war is a bloody, brutal, murderous undertaking--General Sherman's analysis remains correct, war is still hell. The strategy is serving to remind the world that, while Gadhafi is known to one and all as a thoroughly evil man, the rebel leadership is not really known at all, and that their leadership of the Libyan uprising has been fractious and uneven at best; it offers few, if any, real assurances of a government more enlightened that Gadhafi's.  Far from being a "foreign policy triumph", Obama's handling of Libya is still at risk of being an expenditure of American treasure (thankfully, not American blood--yet) with nothing more accomplished than replacing one brutal autocrat with another.

Gadhafi's days of power may be over, but the days of democratic government in Libya are still a long way off. And that is nobody's "foreign policy triumph."

Libya: What has NATO accomplished?

As Libyan rebels consolidated their hold on Tripoli, President Obama attempted to put his stamp of approval on matters by telling the world what it already knew: That Moammar Gadhafi should step down for the good of his people.

No kidding. For the good of humanity Gadhafi should have been overthrown decades ago, or, better yet, never allowed to come to power. Like all dictators (especially dictators with oil-derived wealth), he is not a nice man.
So, for the good of the Libyan people, Gadhafi should bow to fate and surrender to the rebel Transitional National Council, who will of course be far more benign in their rule.

Or will they? Consider for a moment who makes up this group: Their chairman, Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil, has been Gadhafi's Minister of Justice since 2007, having been a judge in the Libyan judicial system since 1978--the system Gahdafi has controlled since seizing power in 1969. While Human Rights Watch did have some kind words for him for his stance on wrongful detention in 2010, he can hardly be called a dissident in the mold of Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma's Nobel Peace laureate and staunch pro-democracy advocate. The other members of the council have all served in various government positions under Gadhafi.

The council members have not been elected by the Libyan people--indeed, their legitimacy seems largely derived from the willingness of other nations to recognize them and not Gadhafi as the "legitimate" government of Libya, and therefore entitled to received arms and other assistance in fighting the Libyan forces loyal to Gadhafi. What historical commitment to democracy and the rule of law do these men actually have?

An even better question might be to ask what history the council has; it did not exist in any form before this past March, when the council, its web site, domain, and Twitter account all magically appeared (is it a real revolution if it isn't "facebook official"?).

While the civilized world may plausibly persuade itself that removing Gadhafi from power is by itself an advancement of freedom in the world, thus far there is little practical proof that those who aim to replace him will be much better--that they were willing to be part of his regime for the better part of their respective careers can hardly be counted as a ringing endorsement of their commitment to democratic government.

Obama says Gadhafi must leave for the sake of the Libyan people. For the sake of the Libyan people, I hope he's right.

Forward Or Backward?

Move America Forward, which presents itself as "the nation’s largest grassroots pro-troop organization", has issued a call for ousted General Stanley McChrystal to "come public with the true extent of the Obama Administration’s disengagement with the war in Afghanistan."

“Now that General McChrystal is no longer part of the military chain of command, he is free to expose the mismanagement of the war by the Obama administration, which is what got him in trouble in the first place.” said Move America Forward’s Director of Communications, Danny Gonzalez. 

Has Obama mismanaged the situation in Afghanistan?  There is an argument to be made that he has--certainly there are deep divisions within the Obama Administration over Afghanistan, divisions Obama has not managed to heal, and it is the civilian side of the US presence in Afghanistan, not the military side, that has a growing rift with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

Yet there are also complaints to be levied against the Pentagon as well.  The glacial pace of the troop buildup in Afghanistan for the "surge" strategy (the last of the 30,000 troops are only now arriving in Afghanistan) can only be laid at the feet of the Pentagon, not the Administration.

If indeed Obama has been "disengaged" from Afghanistan, creating a continuing public controversy over his handling of matters to date is hardly going to assist him becoming "engaged" now.  Operations in Afghanistan are still unfolding, and there will be ample opportunities for General McChrystal to lend his perspective to the strengths and weakness of the Administration's efforts.  To "come public" with inflammatory charges of mismanagement and misconduct does not help the Administration focus its energies on Afghanistan.

Obama has publicly re-committed himself to the "surge" strategy.  In announcing the replacement of McChrystal with General David Petraeus Obama stated: "This is a change in personnel, but this is not a change in policy."

If the goal of  Move America Forward is to ensure the Obama Administration is fully engaged and supportive of the troops in Afghanistan, McChrystal's career-ending flirtation with Rolling Stone has already done most of what can be done to achieve that goal.  Supporting the troops now means standing back and giving the Obama Administration the latitude to manage things as they wish.  Obama remains the Commander In Chief until 2012; for the sake of the troops, that needs to be respected.

McChrystal Out, Petreaus In, Challenge Remains

A day after Rolling Stone published a profile piece of General Stanley McChrystal in which McChrystal and several of his senior staff made caustic, derisive, and arguably insubordinate comments about Obama, Vice President Joe Biden, and several members of Obama's administration, Obama fired McChrystal, replacing him with General David Petraeus, head of the US Army's Central Command (and, ironically, technically McChrystal's superior).

In many respects, Petraeus is an easy choice to make for McChrystal's replacement.  As the architect of the successful "surge" strategy in Iraq that for many has been the model of what needs to take place in Afghanistan, he is arguably the Army's foremost expert on counterinsurgency strategies and tactics (COIN, in the military argot).  As the general many credit with salvaging the situation on the ground in Iraq, Petraeus is quite popular with Republicans in Congress (there has been considerable speculation as to whether Petraeus would be drafted by the Republicans for the 2012  Presidential elections) Indeed, that the new assignment is technically a demotion for Petraeus only serves to underscore the heft Petraeus brings to the table.

What Petraeus does not bring is a substantial alteration to the situation in Afghanistan.  US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Obama's diplomatic lead in Kabul, has never walked back the opposition to a "surge" strategy he voiced  last fall in a series of classified cables to Obama (that were subsequently leaked to the New York Times).  Neither has Vice President Biden, who was quoted by Jonathan Alter in The Promise that "In July of 2011, you’re going to see a whole lot of people moving out, bet on it."--an assertion Secretary of Defense Robert Gates emphatically rejected earlier this week.  Despite assertions by Obama in announing McChrystal's ouster that he could tolerate debate but not division, divisions over Afghanistan are everywhere in Obama's Administration:

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has gone along with the project, but Vice President Joe Biden—who might have been secretary of state had the cards fallen in a slightly different way—has not. Divisions within the administration grow by the day.

Nor does Petraeus have large numbers of troops in his back pocket to take to Afghanistan.  He flies to Kabul alone, to take command of McChrystal's men and execute McChrystal's strategy, on the eve of a major push to retake Kandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city.  The last of the 30,000 troops allocated by Obama to the Afghanistan "surge" are just now arriving on the battlefield--delays in their arrival have been a principal frustration of the Kandahar offensive.  Secretary Gates is counseling patience, to give the strategy time to succeed, but the political reality is that time is running out on Afghanistan; the July 2011 pullout date is fixed in the minds of many, and Americans, by a 53-44 percent margin, do not count the Afghanistan war as one worth fighting--and certainly one not worth American lives.

By replacing McChrystal with Petraeus, Obama is essentially rebutting the crux of McChrystal's Rolling Stone complaints, a lack of strong support for the troops.  However, if all Obama does is replace McChrystal with Petraeus, he will have largely validated McChrystal's complaint.

He may be gone, but McChrystal has managed to box Obama in yet again.

McChrystal and Rolling Stone: Why Obama is losing the Battle of Kabul

General Stanley McChrystal, by opting to be the subject of a profile in Rolling Stone Magazine, to be published in issue 1108/1109 of that publication, touched off a firestorm with the biting criticisms attributed to him and his staff of several members of the Obama Administration, including Barack Obama himself.  The profile piece may very well cost him his career, and could send US military efforts in Afghanistan spiraling into chaos.

There can be no doubt that McChrystal erred by speaking as he did, and by allowing his subordinates to speak as they did, to reporter Michael Hastings.  Not only does Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution explicitly make the President the Commander In Chief of the Armed Forces and therefore McChrystal's superior in the chain of command, but Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice makes insults and criticisms by military officers of the civilians placed over the military an offense punishable at court martial:

Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Transportation, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

Yet what many have overlooked is that the Rolling Stone article portrays McChrystal's deepest conflict as being with US Ambassador to Afghanistan former Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry:

By far the most crucial – and strained – relationship is between McChrystal and Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador. According to those close to the two men, Eikenberry – a retired three-star general who served in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2005 – can't stand that his former subordinate is now calling the shots. He's also furious that McChrystal, backed by NATO's allies, refused to put Eikenberry in the pivotal role of viceroy in Afghanistan, which would have made him the diplomatic equivalent of the general. The job instead went to British Ambassador Mark Sedwill – a move that effectively increased McChrystal's influence over diplomacy by shutting out a powerful rival. "In reality, that position needs to be filled by an American for it to have weight," says a U.S. official familiar with the negotiations.

The relationship was further strained in January, when a classified cable that Eikenberry wrote was leaked to The New York Times. The cable was as scathing as it was prescient. The ambassador offered a brutal critique of McChrystal's strategy, dismissed President Hamid Karzai as "not an adequate strategic partner," and cast doubt on whether the counterinsurgency plan would be "sufficient" to deal with Al Qaeda. "We will become more deeply engaged here with no way to extricate ourselves," Eikenberry warned, "short of allowing the country to descend again into lawlessness and chaos."

McChrystal and his team were blindsided by the cable. "I like Karl, I've known him for years, but they'd never said anything like that to us before," says McChrystal, who adds that he felt "betrayed" by the leak. "Here's one that covers his flank for the history books. Now if we fail, they can say, 'I told you so."

While the comments attributed to McChrystal in the Rolling Stone profile do indeed make him and his staff appear, in the words of John Dickerson of Slate magazine, "petty, frustrated, and reckless," Eikenberry's cable last fall--and its subsequent leaking to the New York Times shows him to be equally so (it was Eikenberry, not McChrystal, who alienated Afghan President Hamid Karzai by attending news conferences called by Karzai's opponents in last year's elections).  That incident also showed the intense competition between Eikenberry and McChrystal for resources and support from Washington:

General Eikenberry has been an energetic envoy, traveling widely around Afghanistan to meet with tribal leaders and to inspect American development projects.

He has been pushing the State Department for additional civilian personnel in the country, including in areas like agriculture, where the United States wants to help wean farmers off cultivating poppies. The State Department has tried to accommodate his requests, according to a senior official, but has turned down some because of budget constraints and its desire to cap the overall number of civilians in Afghanistan at roughly 1,000.

He played a significant role, along with Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, in persuading Mr. Karzai last month to accept the results of an election commission, which called for a runoff presidential ballot.

That Michael Hastings was granted nearly two months of access to the inner workings of McChrystal's staff shortly after the New York Times piece where Eikenberry undermined McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy leaves one wondering if this was not the latest in a tit-for-tat media conflict between McChrystal and Eikenberry.  Even if it is not, there is no denying that Obama's top diplomat in Kabul and Obama's top general in Kabul do not like each other and are taking steps to undermine each other. There is also no denying that Obama appointed them both to serve at his pleasure; it is difficult to envision Obama being pleased with either man at this juncture.

What Michael Hastings has revealed to the world is that the real battle for Kabul is in fact a clash of egos between the leaders of Obama's military and civilian strategies in Afghanistan--strategies which require each other if Obama's chosen task of building the Afghan nation is to succeed.  McChrystal and Eikenberry appear to view each other as more of an enemy than the Taliban or al Qaeda.

While Eikenberry is poised to win that battle (by default, as McChrystal is likely to be forced to resign), there is little likelihood of the clash of egos ending.  McChrystal's staff and deputy commanders are quite loyal to him personally, and any McChrystal replacement needs to come from those ranks if Obama is to avoid any major disruptions in the execution of the counterinsurgency strategy Obama chose in his speech at West Point last December.  The profile piece showed that McChrystal's staff and deputy commanders share his criticisms of the civilians involved in Afghanistan.

What is most disturbing about this ego clash is that it has been going on even as the military and diplomatic situation in Kabul deteriorates, and that it has been going on under Obama's ultimate leadership; nor is there indication of any effort by the Obama Administration to bring McChrystal and Eikenberry to some form of modus vivendi.  The Obama strategy for Afghanistan is a two-pronged strategy that involves defeating the Taliban militarily while building up the Karzai government diplomatically to withstand other insurgencies in the future.  That strategy demands cooperation and coordination between the military and diplomatic personnel in Afghanistan--between McChrystal and Eikenberry.  Not only has Obama not been getting that cooperation, he seemingly has not been demanding such cooperation.

Whether or not McChrystal loses his job over this is problematic, but regardless of that, unless Obama can get the civilian and military personnel in Afghanistan to play nice with each other, he faces a very serious risk of losing Afghanistan.  As the battle for Afghan hearts and minds has played out thus far, the clear loser at this juncture is Barack Obama. 

Afghanistan -- A Chance

Last fall I opined that the Afghani conflict against the insurgent Taliban was an internal civil conflict that was not and should not be the concern of the U.S. Military (Afghanistan: Never America's War). In an interview with The Sunday Times of London, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar confirms my assertion, while also creating an opening for peace in that troubled region, and a chance for American troops to return home.

At a meeting held at night deep inside Taliban-controlled territory, the Taliban leaders told this newspaper that their military campaign had only three objectives: the return of sharia (Islamic law), the expulsion of foreigners and the restoration of security.

Obama himself articulated three objectives for America's military campaign in Afghanistan in his December 2009 speech to the cadets at West Point, when he announced a military buildup in that country:

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan.  We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven.  We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.  And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future. 

It is important to note that al Qaeda--the terrorist movement that remains the justification behind American military adventures in Afghanistan--is not a movement borne of the Taliban but is as foreign to Afghan soil as Americans, being the inspiration and creation of Osama bin Laden, born in Saudi Arabia to parents of Yemeni descent.  Bin Laden is the sole connection between Afghanistan and al Qaeda, as the Afghan guerilla war against the invading Soviet army gave bin Laden his first opportunity to engage in jihad.

Son of a wealthy construction magnate, bin Ladin had taken to the religious sermons of Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian and disciple of Sayyid Qutb. While he participated in few actual battles in Afghanistan, bin Laden became known for his generous funding of the jihad against the Soviets.

However, bin Laden's ambitions extended beyond the boarders of Afghanistan, and he began to develop a complex international organization. He set up a financial support network known as the "Golden Chain," comprised mainly of financiers from Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf states. Using this immense new fund, bin Laden and Azzam created a "Bureau of Services," which helped channel recruits for the jihad into Afghanistan. With Saudi Arabia and the United States pouring in billions of dollars worth of secret assistance to rebels in Afghanistan, the jihad against the Soviets was constantly gaining momentum.

The link between Afghanistan and Al Qaeda went dormant in 1989, after the Soviets pulled out of that country, and bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia:

When the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in early 1989, bin Laden and Azzam decided that their new organization should not dissolve. They established what they called a base (al Qaeda) as a potential general headquarters for future jihad. However, bin Laden, now the clear emir of al Qaeda, and Azzam differed on where the organization's future objectives should lie. Azzam favored continued fighting in Afghanistan until there was a true Islamist government, while bin Laden wanted to prepare al Qaeda to fight anywhere in the world. When Azzam was killed in 1989, bin Laden assumed full charge of al Qaeda.

This aspect of al Qaeda history takes on new importance in light of the Taliban's potential peace overtures, for the very simple reason that Obama and Mullah Omar might actually agree on two of three military objectives: removal of foreigners, and securing Afghanistan and its borders. Both sides want a secure Afghani government, and while Obama focuses on denying al Qaeda safe haven within Afghanistan, the political reality is that, if al Qaeda is expelled from Afghanistan, the rationale for a continued American presence evaporates; expell al Qaeda and all foreign forces will be happy to return home.

If the Taliban's statements are sincere and credible, the only real sticking point between Obama and the Taliban should be the matter of making Sharia Law Afghan Law.  If the Taliban's statements are sincere and credible, the only major obstacle to negotiating that point is the US policy prohibiting direct talks with the Taliban.  Taliban sincerity is and should always be presumed problematic, but the Taliban statements to The Sunday Times are certainly in keeping with their articulated three objectives:

Looking back on five years in government until they were ousted after the attacks in America on September 11, 2001, the Taliban leaders said their movement had become too closely involved in politics.

Abdul Rashid said: “We didn’t have the capability to govern the country and we were surprised by how things went. We lacked people with either experience or technical expertise in government.

“Now all we’re doing is driving the invader out. We will leave politics to civil society and return to our madrasahs [religious schools].”

The Taliban’s position emerged as an American official said colleagues in Washington were discussing whether President Barack Obama could reverse a long-standing US policy and permit direct American talks with the Taliban.

Mullah Omar's interview also highlights another area of agreement with the United States: The Karzai government is corrupt and of questionable electoral legitimacy.

The Taliban objectives specified on their website had already shifted, Nato officials said, from the overthrow of the “puppet government” to the more moderate goal of establishing a government wanted by the Afghan people.

This objective fits rather nicely with another highlight of Obama's West Point speech:

This effort must be based on performance.  The days of providing a blank check are over.  President Karzai's inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction.  And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance.  We'll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people.  We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable.  And we will also focus our assistance in areas -- such as agriculture -- that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.

This much, therefore, is certain: in this moment, at least, the Taliban are saying the right words to move towards a real process of negotiations and ultimate peace. It is also certain that Obama's surge is costing the United States a minimum of $30 Billion, and it is also certain that over 1,000 American servicemen have lost their lives in Afghanistan, and it is therefore certain that more American troops will perish in Afghanistan if a pathway to peace is not found.

Whether Mullah Omar's words open that pathway is the great unanswered question.  The possibility his interview is nothing more than a posture calculated to slow and stymie the troop surge within Afghanistan is real and cannot be dismissed.  Yet the question should be answered--the lives of American soldiers and the tax dollars of American citizens demand it.

Answering that question will require direct talks with the Taliban, if only because neither the United States nor the Taliban has demonstrated any great confidence in the legitimacy of the Karzai government, rendering Karzai and his administration completely compromised as a negotiations partner for either side.  Mullah Omar is suggesting the time for those direct talks is now; if he is sincere, then he is right.  For Obama, the question reduces to one of how to engage the Taliban directly without compromising troop deployments vital to the surge or otherwise ceding vital initiatives to the Taliban.

If Mullah Omar is on the level, and Obama can seize this moment of diplomatic opportunity, then his surge in Afghanistan will have succeeded beyond all expectations. Proper respect for the Americans who fell in Afghanistan-and the Americans who will yet fall in Afghanistan--demands that Obama explore every diplomatic avendue to engage the Taliban and pursue peace rather than continued war.  Mullah Omar has given Obama a chance; pray God Obama finds the courage and the vision to pursue it.